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Abstract 
The article begins with a consideration of the views of commentators,  from both inside and outside 
the Strasbourg system, as to the nature of precedent within the jurisprudence of the Court. The 
approach of the original Court is then examined. This is compared with the contemporary case-law of 
the full-time Court and  three justifications for overruling established rulings are identified in the 
modern jurisprudence. Institutional features of the overruling process, including the roles of third-
parties and Court directed changes, are addressed. Conclusions are drawn as to the present Court’s 
reluctance to expressly acknowledge that it is overruling established case-law and its failure to 
always provide adequate justifications of the social or scientific developments underpinning its 
revised jurisprudence. 
 
 
The phenomenon of the European Court of Human Rights
1
 overruling its earlier case-law is 
an important, but relatively neglected, aspect of the Court’s jurisprudence. Hence this article 
seeks to analyse a number of features of the Court’s departure from previous interpretations 
of the European Convention on Human Rights
2
. We shall consider the Court’s view of 
precedent, the nature of the Court’s departures from previous case-law, the justifications the 
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Court articulates for overruling earlier interpretations, who advocates a change in the 
established case-law and who benefits from the new interpretations. 
The Court’s attitude towards precedent 
In the mid-1980s an official within the Registry of the original, part-time, Court expressed the 
personal view that: 
“With regard to the precedent value of the judgments in later cases before the Court 
itself, it is clear from the reasons advanced by the Court and the frequent references 
therein to previous judgments that the Court in its practice adheres to a limited doctrine 
of stare decisis, even though it is not an absolute doctrine; as appears from, e.g., Rule 
50 of the new Rules of Court
3
, the Court does not exclude the possibility of deviating 
from an earlier case-law. However, according to this Rule, a reversal of an earlier case-
law should be made by the Plenary Court and not by a Chamber.”4 
As further support for his analysis of the significance of precedent during the formative years 
Sundberg cited the opinion of  the Court’s Registrar, Marc-Andre Eissen, that the Court had 
shown “a manifest will not to depart lightly from its previous judgment[s] to which the Court 
frequently refers.”5 Subsequently, at the end of the following decade, writing extra-judicially 
the (then) President of the Court, Luzius Wildhaber, noted the misconceptions that English 
and Continental European lawyers can possess  about the doctrine of precedent in the other’s 
legal system(s). 
“Continental European observers often stress that the English system is too rigid. They 
may overlook that there are important exceptions to the rule of stare decisis; that 
common law judges tend to reason prudently upwards from the facts of a case, whereas 
Continental judges are inclined to reason sweepingly downwards from abstract 
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 Rule 50 of the Rules of Court issued in 1983 provided: “Where a case pending before a Chamber raises one or 
more serious questions affecting the interpretation of the Convention, the Chamber may, at any time during 
the proceedings, relinquish jurisdiction in favour of the plenary Court. The relinquishment of jurisdiction shall 
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judgement previously delivered by a Chamber or the plenary Court. Reasons need not be given for the decision 
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5
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principles...  English observers, by contrast, may be mislead by Continental European 
writers and courts who assert dogmatically that they acknowledge no doctrine of 
precedent; that only  a series of  court decisions can acquire binding force, presumably 
because it must form customary law; and that the courts are no legislators, nor should 
they be. Again, such a view is lopsided. It overlooks that, as a matter of fact, 
Continental European courts normally and regularly observe precedents, their own as 
well as those of superior courts.”6 
Against the backdrop of this  mutual misunderstanding he disclosed that: 
“Discussions inside the European Court of Human Rights relatively often reveal 
disagreements as to whether an earlier precedent should be followed. This is not 
surprising in an international court with so many different legal orders and traditions.”7 
However, in his opinion: 
“...I would suggest that precedents are followed regularly, but not invariably, that “for 
the sake of attaining uniformity, consistency and certainty”, precedents should normally 
be observed, where “they are not plainly unreasonable and inconvenient” (Mirehouse v 
Rennell
8
), that one “big” case- like Marckx9, Klass10, Sunday Times11, Golder12, 
Soering
13
, Loizidou
14
, Akdivar
15
, or United Communist Party of Turkey
16
-may 
constitute just as valid a precedent as a line of  lesser cases; that precedents should 
normally be followed even before the existence of  actual customary law can be 
demonstrated; and that sound judicial caution requires that the underlying rationale of a 
case should not be defined so as to be too far detached from the specific facts.”17 
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 At about the same time, Professor David Feldman examined the application of the 
principle of stare decisis in the jurisprudence of the Court and concluded that: 
“Decisions of the Court represent authoritative interpretations of the ECHR under 
social and moral conditions and the state of scientific knowledge current at the time of 
the decision. They are usually followed, because that is, “in the interests of legal 
certainty and the orderly development of the Convention case-law.”18 Nevertheless, the 
Court may subsequently decide that its earlier interpretation was simply erroneous, or 
may have other “cogent reasons” for changing its interpretation, including the need to 
“ensure  that the interpretation of the Convention reflects societal changes and remains 
in line with present day conditions”.19  ...There is no real distinction drawn by the Court 
between ratio decidendi and obiter dictum in its previous pronouncements. All 
statements are regarded as sources of enlightenment as to the meaning of the ECHR.
20
 
Professor Feldman considered that the Court’s role as “a tribunal of public international 
law”21 committed to interpreting a human rights treaty in a dynamic manner22 were crucial 
elements underlying the Court’s attitude towards the doctrine of precedent. 
 More recently, in a comparative study of the use of precedent by the International 
Court of Justice and the Court, Michael Balcerzak endorsed the view that: 
“It remains perfectly clear that the doctrine of stare decisis does not apply in the ECHR 
system, and it follows that the doctrine of binding precedent (precedent de jure) must 
be rejected. However, the Court deliberately develops its case-law along the doctrine of 
non-binding precedent, being guided by convincing reasons, such as the principle of 
legal safety and orderly development of case-law.”23 
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Adopting the analysis of Bronaugh
24
 he characterised the Court’s use of precedent as a 
doctrine of “persuasive precedent” or “precedents de facto” whereby earlier judgments are 
recognised as having precedential significance in later cases. 
 Hence, there is a broad consensus amongst commentators, working both within and 
outside the Strasbourg institutions, that significant rulings by the Court on the interpretation 
and application of the Convention are generally followed in subsequent cases. Turning to the 
contemporary jurisprudence of the full-time Court, established under Protocol 11
25
, on the 
topic it has stated: 
“74. While the Court is not formally bound to follow its previous judgments, it is in the 
interests of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the law that it should not 
depart, without good reason, from precedents laid down in previous cases (see, for 
example, Chapman v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 27238/95, ECHR 2001-I, § 70). 
However, since the Convention is first and foremost a system for the protection of 
human rights, the Court must have regard to the changing conditions within the 
respondent State and within Contracting States generally and respond, for example, to 
any evolving convergence as to the standards to be achieved (see, amongst other 
authorities, the Cossey [v.UK] judgment, p. 14, § 35, and Stafford v. the United 
Kingdom [GC], no. 46295/99, judgment of 28 May 2002, to be published in ECHR 
2002-, §§ 67-68). It is of crucial importance that the Convention is interpreted and 
applied in a manner which renders its rights practical and effective, not theoretical and 
illusory. A failure by the Court to maintain a dynamic and evolutive approach would 
indeed risk rendering it a bar to reform or improvement (see the above-cited Stafford 
v. the United Kingdom judgment, § 68).”26 
Another Grand Chamber in the later case of Mamatkulov and Askarov v Turkey
27
 used almost 
identical wording to re-state the Court’s approach to precedent. Likewise during 2007 a 
differently constituted Grand Chamber repeated the key phraseology of the above quotation 
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in Vilho Eskelinen and Others v Finland
28
. Consequently, we can discern that today the Court 
mandates the need for “good reason” where it decides not to follow previous case-law.  
Before we examine the modern jurisprudence to discover what different types of  
grounds have been found to justify overruling previous case-law we should note that the 
original Court was extremely reluctant to expressly overrule established interpretations of the 
Convention. Judge Martens, with the research help of the Court’s Registrar, stated in his 
Separate Opinion in Brozicek v Italy
29
: 
“As far as I am aware, there are no examples of explicit overruling in the Court’s case-
law. That does not mean, of course, that the Court would hold that it lacks power to 
overrule its own precedents; it did so implicitly in paragraph 78 of its above mentioned 
De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp [v Belgium] judgment [A.12 (1971)] where it in fact 
retracted what it had said in paragraph 24 of its Neumeister [v Austria] judgment A.8 
(1968).”30 
In De Wilde et al, often referred to as the “Vagrancy” cases, the Court when elaborating upon 
the institutional and procedural requirements of a “court’s” scrutiny of the legality of a 
person’s detention ruled that: 
“78.  ...The forms of procedure required by the Convention need not, however, 
necessarily be identical in each of the cases where the intervention of a court is 
required. In order to determine whether  a proceeding provides adequate guarantees, 
regard must be had to the particular nature of the circumstances in which such 
proceeding takes place. Thus, in the Neumeister case, the Court considered that the 
competent courts remained “courts” in spite of the lack of “equality of arms” between 
the prosecution and an individual who requested provisional release (ibidem); 
nevertheless, the same might not be true in a different context and, for example, in 
another situation which is also governed by Article 5(4).”31 
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Thereby, requiring a more elaborate judicial procedure (including allowing detainees to 
require an adjournment to facilitate the presentation of their case ) to be made available to 
detainees, without clearly stating that Neumeister was wrong. 
 Another dramatic example of the original Court implicitly overruling established 
case-law occurred in Huber v Switzerland
32
 concerning the compatibility of  the multifarious 
roles of Swiss’ district attorneys with the need for independence and impartiality in the 
judicial authority examining the lawfulness of  the arrest and detention of criminal suspects 
under Article 5(3) of the Convention. Huber had been questioned by a particular district 
attorney in connection with an investigation into prostitution. After the questioning the 
district attorney ordered that Huber be detained. She was released eight days later. 
Subsequently, the same district attorney instituted proceedings against Huber alleging that 
she had provided false evidence during questioning and had been an accessory to a criminal 
offence. Eventually, Huber complained to the European Commission of Human Rights
33
 
contending that Article 5(3) had been breached as the district attorney’s roles of investigator, 
authoriser of detention and prosecutor undermined the necessary guarantee of independence 
required of the judicial officer by that provision. Despite the Court having previously found 
no breach of Article 5(3) when applied to another district attorney in Schiesser v 
Switzerland
34
, the Commission, by twelve votes to two, expressed the opinion that there had 
been a breach in Huber’s case. The Commission and the Swiss Government referred the case 
to the Court. Before the latter body the Commission’s Delegate:  
“...invited the Court to depart from the Schiesser judgment... In the Delegate’s view, the 
Court’s case-law has moved towards the principle that prosecution and judicial 
                                                          
32
 A.188 (1990). 
33
 Hereafter the Commission. 
34
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functions must be completely separated; such separation was, he considered, necessary 
at this stage in the development of the protection of human rights in Europe.”35 
By twenty-one votes to one, the plenary Court held that: 
“42. In several judgments which post-date the Schiesser judgment and which concern 
Netherlands legislation on the arrest and detention of military personnel (the de Jong, 
Baljet and van den Brink judgment A.77 (1984)...) the Court found that the auditeur-
militair, who had ordered the detention of the applicants, could also be called upon to 
assume, in the same case, the role of prosecuting authority after referral of the case to 
the Military Court. It concluded from this that he could not be “independent of the 
parties” at that preliminary stage precisely because he was “liable” to become one of 
the parties at the next stage in the procedure. 
43. The Court sees no ground for reaching a different conclusion in this case as regards 
criminal justice under the ordinary law. Clearly the Convention does not rule out the 
possibility of the judicial officer who orders the detention carrying out other duties, but 
his impartiality is open to doubt...if he is entitled to intervene in the subsequent criminal 
proceedings as a representative of the prosecuting authority. 
Since that was the situation in the present case, there has been a breach of Article 
5(3).”36 
President Wildhaber described  this judgment as the Court “indirectly” overruling Schiesser 
whilst noting that the Court “refused to speak of an “overruling””.37 So even when the Court 
was effectively pronouncing a complete reversal of its previous interpretation of a 
Convention provision the judges sought to mask this by not expressly acknowledging that 
they were overruling their earlier case-law. 
 One year later the plenary Court adopted the same strategy when it implicitly  
overruled its previous acceptance of the Belgian avocat general, a member of the procureur 
general’s department, having the last word on whether an appeal should be allowed by the 
Court of Cassation and then participating (without having  a vote) in the deliberations of that 
court. In Borgers v Belgium
38
, the applicant, a lawyer convicted of forgery, complained that 
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he had not been able to reply to the avocat general’s submissions to the Court of Cassation 
determining Borger’s appeal and the avocat general had attended the court’s deliberations 
with the result that there had been a breach of his right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 
6(1).  The Commission, by fourteen votes to one, considered that there had been a breach. 
Before the Court, the Commission’s Delegate, “invited the Court to reconsider the view taken 
in its judgment in Delcourt v Belgium
39”40, where no breach of Article 6(1) had been found in 
respect of the roles undertaken by the avocat general.  The plenary Court, by eighteen votes 
to four, endorsed the Delcourt findings as to the independence and impartiality of the Court 
of Cassation and the  procureur general’s department. However, the plenary Court held that it 
was also necessary to examine whether the proceedings before the Court of Cassation 
respected the principle of the equality of arms which, “has undergone a considerable 
evolution in the Court’s case-law, notably  in respect of the importance attached to 
appearances and to the increased sensitivity of the public to the fair administration of 
justice..”41 The Court then criticised Borger’s inability to respond once the avocat general had 
submitted, to the Court of Cassation, that the former’s appeal should be dismissed. 
“28. Further and above all, the inequality was increased even more by the avocat 
general’s participation in an advisory capacity, in the Court’s deliberations. Assistance 
of this nature, given with total objectivity, may be of some use in drafting judgments, 
although this task falls in the first place to the Court of Cassation itself. It is however 
hard to see how such assistance can remain limited to stylistic considerations, which are 
in case often indissociable from substantive matters, if it is in addition intended, as the 
Government also affirmed, to contribute towards maintaining the consistency of the 
case-law. Even if such assistance was so limited in the present case, it could reasonably 
be thought that the deliberations afforded the avocat general an additional opportunity 
to promote, without fear of contradiction by the applicant, his submissions to the effect 
that the appeal should be dismissed. 
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29. In conclusion, having regard to the requirements of the rights of the defence and of 
the principle of the equality of arms and to the role of appearances in determining 
whether they have been complied with, the Court finds a violation of Article 6(1).”42 
So, again, the Court did not explicitly  acknowledge that it was overruling an earlier 
judgment. By contrast, Judge Martens began his Dissenting Opinion by observing, “[i]n its 
judgment the Court has overruled the Delcourt decision.”43 He was highly critical of the 
majority’s approach towards the unanimous judgment in Delcourt and “[m]oreover, the Court 
has failed to do what a court that overrules an important judgment should do: it failed to state 
its reasons for doing so clearly and convincingly.”44 Later, we shall examine whether the 
contemporary Court is more open regarding its reversal of established case-law. 
The justifications advanced by the Court for overruling previous judgments 
The existence of “uncertainty” in the existing case-law has been invoked several times by the 
full-time Court to justify a new interpretation of the Convention. For example, in Pellegrin v 
France
45
, the Grand Chamber was faced with the question whether litigation between civil 
servants and their employer fell within the “civil rights and obligations” limb of Article 6(1)? 
The Court noted that its previous case-law had established that generally disputes concerning 
the recruitment, careers and termination of employment of  civil servants fell outside Article 
6(1). But, a number of judgments had limited that principle of exclusion.  
“60. The Court considers that, as it stands, the above case-law contains a margin of  
uncertainty for Contracting States as to the scope of their obligations under Article 6(1) 
in disputes raised by employees in the  public sector over their conditions of service.  ... 
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61. The Court therefore wishes to put an end to the uncertainty which surrounds 
application of the guarantees of Article 6(1) to disputes between States and their 
servants.”46 
Consequently, the Court articulated an autonomous interpretation of the term “civil service” 
based on a functional criterion. 
“66. The Court therefore rules that the only disputes excluded from the scope of Article 
6(1) of the Convention are those which are raised by public servants whose duties 
typify the specific activities of the public service in so far as the latter is acting as the 
depositary of public  authority responsible for protecting the general interests of the 
State or other public authorities...”47 
Applying this new approach the Court, by thirteen votes to four, determined that the 
applicant, a management consultant who had been employed by the French Ministry of 
Development to advise the government of Equatorial Guinea on its budget, came within the 
excluded class. However, the four dissenters disagreed with the majority’s stance: 
“Introduction of the criterion of participation in the exercise of powers conferred by 
public law does not avoid the risk of arbitrariness and creates a new zone of 
uncertainty.”48 
 
Prophetically, the dissenters also identified the weakness in the majority’s approach which 
denied a “civil servant” the full protection of Article 6(1) even where under domestic law 
such a person had the right to lodge a complaint against his/her employer before an 
independent tribunal. 
 Eight years later another Grand Chamber, with Judge Tulkens having the majority on 
her side on this occasion, overruled Pellegrin. The applicants in Vilho Eskelinen and Others v 
Finland
49
, were several police officers and an administrator working for the police who had 
their local wage supplements removed when their police district was re-organised. The 
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applicants unsuccessfully challenged the loss of their supplements before the domestic courts. 
Eventually, the applicants complained to Strasbourg alleging breaches of Article 6(1) by the 
Finnish courts, including excessive delays. A majority of twelve Judges concluded that the 
Pellegrin functional criterion approach could produce “anomalous results”50, as in this case 
where the police officer applicants would not be protected by Article 6(1) but the 
administrator would be. Nor had it been easy to determine its application in subsequent cases.  
“55. The Court can only conclude that the functional criterion, as applied in practice, 
has not simplified the analysis of the applicability of Article 6 in proceedings to which 
a civil servant is a party or brought about a greater degree of certainty in this area as 
intended (see, mutatis mutandis, Perez v. France [GC], no. 47287/99, § 55, ECHR 
2004-I.). 
56. It is against this background and for these reasons that the Court finds that the 
functional criterion adopted in the case of Pellegrin must be further developed. While it 
is in the interests of legal certainty, foreseeability and equality before the law that the 
Court should not depart, without good reason, from precedents laid down in previous 
cases, a failure by the Court to maintain a dynamic and evolutive approach would risk 
rendering it a bar to reform or improvement (see, mutatis mutandis, Mamatkulov and 
Askarov v. Turkey [GC], nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, § 121, ECHR 2005-I.).”51 
 
The new test for determining if particular civil servants could claim the protection of Article 
6(1) should be: 
“...in order for the respondent State to be able to rely before the Court on the applicant's 
status as a civil servant in excluding the protection embodied in Article 6, two 
conditions must be fulfilled. Firstly, the State in its national law must have expressly 
excluded access to a court for the post or category of staff in question. Secondly, the 
exclusion must be justified on objective grounds in the State's interest. The mere fact 
that the applicant is in a sector or department which participates in the exercise of 
power conferred by public law is not in itself decisive. In order for the exclusion to be 
justified, it is not enough for the State to establish that the civil servant in question 
participates in the exercise of public power or that there exists, to use the words of the 
Court in the Pellegrin judgment, a “special bond of trust and loyalty” between the civil 
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servant and the State, as employer. It is also for the State to show that the subject matter 
of the dispute in issue is related to the exercise of State power or that it has called into 
question the special bond. Thus, there can in principle be no justification for the 
exclusion from the guarantees of Article 6 of ordinary labour disputes, such as those 
relating to salaries, allowances or similar entitlements, on the basis of the special nature 
of relationship between the particular civil servant and the State in question. There will, 
in effect, be a presumption that Article 6 applies. It will be for the respondent 
Government to demonstrate, first, that a civil-servant applicant does not have a right of 
access to a court under national law and, second, that the exclusion of the rights under 
Article 6 for the civil servant is justified.”52 
Applying this new methodology the Court held that as all the applicants had a right of access 
to a court under Finnish law to determine their employment disputes so Article 6(1) was 
applicable to them. By fourteen votes to three the Grand Chamber then found that the 
domestic first instance proceedings had exceeded the reasonable time guarantee under that 
Article. 
 The current President of the Court joined by his predecessor and three other judges 
issued a dissenting opinion which criticised the analysis of the majority and its approach to 
precedent. 
“6. In any event, we fail to see what theoretical or practical necessity required the Court 
to abandon the Pellegrin case-law in the present case. It has been applied by the Court 
for seven years without any real problem and, as could have been expected and desired, 
it has extended rather than restricted the application of the guarantees secured under 
Article 6 § 1. The categories of agents excluded from these guarantees, such as the 
police service in its entirety, are limited when compared with public service employees 
as a whole... Legal certainty has certainly improved if we compare the situation with 
that which obtained prior to the Pellegrin judgment. As to the argument based on the 
existence of access to a domestic court, we are not convinced by it. As Article 53 of the 
Convention rightly points out, nothing prevents a High Contracting Party from 
recognising in its law freedoms or guarantees which go further than those set forth in 
the Convention; in addition, as legal systems vary from one State to another, the 
reasoning in the instant judgment is likely to have the effect of making the applicability 
of Article 6 § 1 to disputes between the State and its agents dependent on there existing 
access to a court with jurisdiction to decide them within the domestic legal system. To 
sum up, instead of the “autonomous interpretation” (by the Court) that the latter 
considered it important to establish for the purposes of Article 6 § 1 (see the Pellegrin 
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judgment, § 63), the instant judgment encourages a dependent and variable, not to say 
uncertain, interpretation, in other words an arbitrary one. In our opinion, this is an 
inappropriate step back. 
7. In conclusion, the Court has overturned its well-established case-law. Admittedly, it 
is entitled to do so (even if the case-law in question is relatively recent). In general, 
however, the Court takes this step where there are new developments and where a new 
need arises. This is not the case here. Abandoning a solid precedent in such conditions 
creates legal uncertainty and, in our opinion, will make it difficult for the States to 
identify the extent of their obligations.”53 
 
Consequently, resolving uncertainty in the  case-law was invoked by the majority in Pellegrin 
to support adopting a new functional test. To which the dissenters replied that the new test 
would create further uncertainty. Then a few years later another Grand Chamber majority 
concluded that the Pellegrin test had not created certainty and therefore it should be replaced 
by a different set of criteria. But several senior members of the Court retorted that this 
abandonment of a “solid precedent” was not justified and would itself create legal 
uncertainty! Hence the claim of reducing legal uncertainty is a highly malleable tool in the 
hands of both judges who wish to overrule existing case-law and those who support the 
retention of established precedent. 
 A Grand Chamber judgment where all the judges were united in concluding that the 
existing case-law presented, “a number of  drawbacks, particularly in terms of legal 
certainty”54 was Perez v France55. The complaint concerned civil-party proceedings through 
which a private person could join criminal proceedings against another person with the object 
of securing compensation from the alleged offender.. The applicant contended that the French 
courts had violated Article 6(1) when they discontinued her civil-party proceedings against 
her children, concerning an alleged assault by them against her. The basic issue for the Court 
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was to determine which types of civil-party proceedings came  within the civil rights limb of 
Article 6(1).  Given the defects in the earlier case-law and the fact that several other States 
had similar civil-party proceedings in their domestic legal orders, the Court decided to adopt 
a new approach to applying Article 6(1) to such proceedings. Generally, civil-party 
proceedings would be protected except where the individual was seeking to bring an actio 
popularis. Perez’s civil-party proceedings fell within Article 6(1), however the Court found 
no breach of her right to a fair trial. So, again, we discover uncertainty in the established 
case-law as the basis for the Court developing a new interpretation of the Convention. Where 
the judges are unanimous in reaching this assessment of the state of the existing jurisprudence 
the strength of the justification for providing a new approach is clearly greater than where the 
Court is divided as in Pellegrin and Vilho. 
 A second justification invoked by the full-time Court has been the need to alter 
precedent in order to  respond to increasing numbers of applications. In Kudla v Poland
56
 the 
Grand Chamber was faced with one of the many complainants alleging unreasonable delays 
in the determination of criminal (and civil) cases by national courts in several member 
States.
57
 Kudla contended that the protracted criminal proceedings against him violated both 
his right to the determination of the criminal charge(s) within a reasonable time (under 
Article 6(1)) and a breach of Article 13, right to an effective domestic remedy, as the Polish 
legal system failed to provide such a remedy to enable him to challenge the delays in the 
criminal proceedings. The Grand Chamber noted that previously the Court had declined to 
examine Article 13 complaints in cases where it had found a breach of the Article 6(1) 
reasonable time guaranteed. However: 
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“148. In the Court’s view, the time has come to review its case-law in the light of the 
continuing accumulation of applications before it in which the only, or principal, 
allegation is  that of a failure to ensure a hearing within a reasonable time in breach of 
Article 6(1). 
The growing frequency with which violations in this regard are being found has 
recently led the Court to draw attention to “the important danger” that exists for the rule 
of law within national legal orders when “excessive delays in the administration of 
justice” occur “in respect of which litigants have no domestic remedy”... 
149. Against this background, the Court does now perceive the need to examine the 
applicant’s complaint under Article 13 taken separately, in addition to its earlier finding 
of a violation of Article 6(1) for failure to try him within a reasonable time.”58 
The Grand Chamber adopted this new interpretation of Article 13, requiring States to 
establish effective domestic remedies to deal with complaints of unreasonable delay in court 
proceedings, because the previous approach was forcing applicants to bring their Article 6(1) 
unreasonable delay complaints to Strasbourg rather than having them resolved domestically. 
The Grand Chamber believed that the earlier approach threatened the long-term efficient 
functioning of the Convention’s  protection system.  Judge Casadevall did not think “that it 
was necessary for the Court to depart from precedent”59 in altering its interpretation of Article 
13. Indeed, he was scathing of the majority’s reasoning, “based on the continuing 
accumulation of length-of-proceedings cases before the Court, is of no legal interest.”60  
Whilst Kudla is the most dramatic example of the full-time Court overruling previous 
case-law in order to try and reduce the torrent of applications overwhelming the  Court
61
, 
there are suggestions in the dicta of other judgments that workload pressures on the Court 
have an influence on its jurisprudence. For example, Judge Martens referred to the “rather 
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alarming increase in the Court’s case-load”62 as the “decisive practical argument”63 in favour 
of the original Court overruling its established approach towards examining preliminary 
objections to the admissibility of applications. Whilst later, Judge Ferrari Bravo began his 
Concurring Opinion in Pellegrin
64
 by observing that: 
“I voted in favour of the Pellegrin judgment, since I believe it is important for the 
Court, in the light of the avalanche of applications concerning the economic treatment 
of public servants, to lay down precise criteria to guide its case-law on Article 6 § 1 of 
the Convention.”65 
 
 A third justification expounded by the Court when overruling previous case-law has 
been the application of the living instrument doctrine to ensure that the Convention is 
interpreted in a manner that reflects contemporary standards. We have seen this justification 
utilised by the original Court  in Borgers
66
 where “the increased sensitivity of the public to 
the fair administration of justice”67 was cited by the majority as the basis for reversing its 
previous assessment of the legality of the privileges/roles of the avocat general vis-a-vis 
appellants/defendants. Similarly, the full-time Court was unanimous in adopting a new 
broader approach to the classification of acts of mal-treatment as constituting “torture”, under 
Article 3, due to rising human rights standards in Selmouni v France
68
. The applicant, a 
Dutch/Moroccan national, complained inter alia that abusive treatment during police 
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questioning amounted to torture. The Commission considered that the abuse was sufficiently 
serious to be so classified. However, before the Court the French government contended that 
applying existing case-law the abuse did not attain the gravity of torture. This was disputed 
by the Dutch government. The Grand Chamber held that: 
“...having regard to the fact that the Convention is a “living instrument instrument 
which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions”...the Court considers 
that certain acts which were classified in the past as “inhuman and degrading treatment” 
as opposed to “torture” could be classified differently in future. It takes the view that 
the increasingly high standard being required in the area of the protection of human 
rights and fundamental liberties correspondingly and inevitably requires greater 
firmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values of democratic societies.”69   
 
Therefore, the Court concluded that Selmouni had been tortured. It should be noted that the 
Court provided little factual support for its assertion of rising human rights standards 
(desirable as that may be) other than the coming into force, in 1987, of the United Nations 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment. This omission replicates the failure of the majority in Borgers to substantiate 
their analogous claim according to Judge Martens in that case: 
“The point made by the Court suggests that since the Delcourt judgment there have 
been “societal changes” in this respect which warrant overruling. Thus it echoes a 
similar observation made during the hearing before the Court by counsel for the 
applicant. Counsel provided no specific grounds for his suggestion that since the 
Delcourt judgment there had been an evolution in this respect. Neither does the Court. 
It merely refers to its case-law; but there one will look in vain for a factual basis for the 
alleged “increased sensitivity of the public”.  
Yet, general allegations such as this require a proper basis in fact.”70 
 Legal developments in States outside the Council of Europe have been used by the 
Court to support evolutive interpretations of the Convention that diverge from previous case-
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law. A classic example was Christine Goodwin
71
, where the unanimous Grand Chamber 
departed from a long line of previous judgments finding that the UK’s partial recognition of 
the new identity of post-operative transsexuals did not breach their Article 8 right to respect 
for their private lives. To justify its stricter interpretation of  the State’s obligations under that 
Article the Court observed, “[t]he latest survey submitted by Liberty in the present case 
shows a continuing international trend towards legal recognition.”72 That document disclosed 
legal recognition of gender re-assignment in Singapore, Canada, South Africa, Israel, 
Australia, New Zealand and many states in the USA.  
A controversial departure from earlier case-law that was partially justified on the basis 
of international jurisprudence was the Court’s ruling in Mamatkulov and Askarov73 that 
member States were bound to comply with interim measures indicated to them by the Court. 
Although the original Court had determined that the Commission had no authority to issue 
such binding measures in Cruz Varas and Others v Sweden
74
 and that judgment had been 
applied by the full-time Court in Conka v Belgium
75
, the majority of the Grand Chamber (14 
votes to 3) declined to follow those cases. 
“The Court observes that the ICJ, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the 
Human Rights Committee and the Committee against Torture of the United Nations, 
although operating under different treaty provisions to those of the Court, have 
confirmed in their reasoning in recent decisions that the preservation of the asserted 
rights of the parties in the face of  the risk of irreparable damage represents an essential 
objective of interim measures in international law. Indeed it can be said that, whatever 
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the legal system in question, the proper administration of justice requires that no 
irreparable action be taken while proceedings are pending...”76 
Therefore, the majority concluded that Turkey had breached Article 34 of the Convention 
(hindering the applicants’ effective exercise of their right to lodge a complaint with the 
Court) by failing to obey the Court’s interim measure not to extradite the applicants while the 
Court was considering their applications. In a joint dissent Judges Caflisch, Turmen and 
Kovler observed that the “precedent” established in Cruz Varas had been applied by the full-
time Court to its own powers in Conka and “[w]e do not think that there has been any change 
since Conka which would justify the Court on a re-examination of its case-law reaching a 
diametrically opposite conclusion.”77 As to the relevance of the jurisprudence from other 
international bodies the dissenters considered that they concerned treaties where States had 
empowered the issuing of binding interim measures by the relevant authorities. Hence, there 
is substance in the dissenters’ criticism that the majority in Mamatkulov had exercised a 
“legislative function” in according the Court the power to issue binding interim measures. 
 Developments in the domestic legal perceptions of a respondent State have also been 
utilised by the Court as a basis for overruling precedent. A leading example is Stafford v 
UK
78
, concerning the compatibility of the established mandatory life sentence regime with 
Article 5 (right to liberty) of the Convention. The original Court had held in Wynne v UK
79
 
that regime, including the crucial powers exercised by the Home Secretary, met the 
requirements of Article 5. In Stafford the Grand Chamber considered that the evolutive 
approach encompassed both international and domestic advances. 
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“Similar considerations apply as regards the changing conditions and any emerging 
consensus discernable within the domestic legal order of the respondent Contracting 
State. Although there is no material distinction on the facts between this case and 
Wynne, having regard to the significant developments in the domestic sphere, the Court 
proposes to reassess “in the light of present-day conditions” what is now the 
appropriate interpretation and application of the Convention..”80 
This stance enabled the Grand Chamber to conclude that there had been  breaches of Article 
5(1)(a) and 5(4)  in respect of the last eighteen months of the applicant’s detention as the 
Home Secretary’s refusal to release him had not been justified by Safford’s original murder 
conviction nor had a judicial body with adequate powers and procedures reviewed the 
lawfulness of his continued imprisonment. Speaking later President Wildhaber described this 
process as “judicial osmosis” whereby “developments in the domestic legal system 
influenced Strasbourg to change its case-law, which in turn results in the consolidation of the 
evolution at national level”.81 
 A more divisive reliance on domestic legal developments was asserted by the Grand 
Chamber majority (of twelve judges) in Z. and others v United Kingdom
82
 when finding no 
breach of the applicants’ right of access to a court (under Article 6(1)). The House of Lords 
had ruled that the applicants’ claims against a local authority for alleged negligence/breach of  
a statutory duty, in failing to protect them against serious abuse by their parents, should be 
struck out as disclosing no cause of action.
83
 Before the Grand Chamber  the applicants 
contended, following Osman v United Kingdom
84
, that such an exclusionary rule constituted a 
breach of their right of access to a court. The majority held that: 
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The Court considers that its reasoning in Osman was based on an understanding of the 
law of negligence (see, in particular, Osman, cited above, pp. 3166-67, §§ 138-39) 
which has to be reviewed in the light of the clarifications subsequently made by the 
domestic courts and notably by the House of Lords. The Court is satisfied that the law 
of negligence as developed in the domestic courts since the case of Caparo Industries 
plc [v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605] and as recently analysed in the case of  Barrett [v 
London Borough of Enfield [1999] 3 WLR 79] includes the fair, just and reasonable 
criterion as an intrinsic element of the duty of care and that the ruling of law concerning 
that element in this case does not disclose the operation of an immunity. In the present 
case, the Court is led to the conclusion that the inability of the applicants to sue the 
local authority flowed not from an immunity but from the applicable principles 
governing the substantive right of action in domestic law. There was no restriction on 
access to a court of the kind contemplated in Ashingdane [v United Kingdom (1985) A. 
93].
85
 
Whereas Judge Thomassen, joined by Judges Casadevall and Klover, rejected the view that 
there had been any important developments in the common law: 
The majority’s reasons for not following the decisions in Osman are not, to my mind, 
convincing. There seem to have been no striking or significant changes in the law of 
negligence since that case and all relevant matters concerning the content of domestic 
law had been brought to the attention of the Court by the parties in Osman. I am of the 
opinion that the conclusion under Article 6 in this case must be the same.
86
 
Hence assessing the existence and extent of potentially subtle evolutions in domestic private 
law regimes may be problematic for a supra-national human rights tribunal. 
 Most recently a unanimous Grand Chamber utilised a combination of developments in 
international and national law, together with the practice of member States to justify 
overruling, or as the Court described it “reconsidered”, the long-established exclusion of the 
right of trade unions to collectively bargain with employers as a component of the right to 
form and join trade unions under Article 11.
87
 In Demir and Baykara v Turkey
88
, a trade 
union representing local authority employees had its legal existence denied and its collective 
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agreement with a  council invalidated by the Court of Cassation. Taking account of, inter 
alia, the European Union’s Charter of Fundamental Rights, changes to the Turkish 
constitution and legislation post-dating this application and the practice of the “vast majority” 
of European States, the Grand Chamber ruled that trade unions’ right to collectively bargain 
had: 
...become one of the essential elements of the “right to form and to join trade unions for 
the protection of [one’s] interests” set forth in Article 11 of the Convention, it being 
understood that States remain free to organise their systems so as, if appropriate, to 
grant special status to representative trade unions.
89
 
However, whilst agreeing that  Article 11 had been breached, Judge Zagrebelsky stated that: 
I have the feeling that the Court’s departure from precedent represents a correction of 
its previous case-law rather than an adaptation of case-law to a real change, at European 
or domestic level, in the legislative framework (as was the case, for example , in its 
Stafford v UK  judgment) or in the relevant social and cultural ethos (as, for example, in 
Christine Goodwin v UK).
90
 
The potentially significant extension of the scope of Article 11 being articulated by the Grand 
Chamber may explain why so many different bases for applying the evolutive approach were 
invoked by the Court. 
We have now discovered that the full-time Court has utilised a number of different 
justifications for overruling established case-law. These include the need to resolve 
uncertainty in the jurisprudence, which we have seen is a double-edged tool that can be used 
by both  judges who wish to alter precedent and those who wish to affirm existing case-law. 
However, the justification invoked most frequently by the Court is the duty to ensure that the 
Convention is interpreted in an evolutionary manner that reflects contemporary standards in 
accordance with the living instrument doctrine. As our above analysis discloses a variety of 
sources of developments have been taken cognisance of by the Court encompassing public 
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expectations (Selmouni), international developments (Christine Goodwin) and evolving 
domestic understandings (Stafford) when departing from previous case-law. Although the 
full-time Court has deployed a range of justifications for overruling earlier judgments it has 
followed the circumspect approach of its predecessor in avoiding expressly stating that it is so 
doing. Instead,  the Court either does not clearly declare that it is overruling a previous 
judgment (as happened in Mamatkulov regarding Conka) or the Court uses euphemistic 
language (e.g. the existing case-law is being “further developed” in Vilho). It has been left to 
dissenting judges to decry the majority using starker epithets, vividly demonstrated by the 
five dissenters in Vilho who criticised the Court for  having “overturned its well-established 
case-law.”91 
Institutional features of the overruling process 
Under the original Strasbourg control system the Commission had a strategic role in seeking 
to persuade the Court to reconsider its established case-law.  We have examined above how 
the Commission’s Delegates in Huber92 and Borgers93 successfully contended that the Court 
ought to depart from established precedents. Obviously, with the abolition of the Commission 
under the Protocol 11 reforms there is no longer the opportunity for such a quasi-judicial  
contribution from another Strasbourg body.  However, Protocol 14 does empower the 
Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights to submit written comments and take 
part in hearings before Chambers and the Grand Chamber of the Court.
94
 Given the current 
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Commissioner’s regular published viewpoints on different aspects of human rights 
protection
95
 it is entirely conceivable that he could assume an analogous role to that of the 
former Commission in providing an independent source of argument to the Court as to when 
it should overrule earlier jurisprudence. But, Russia’s continuing refusal to ratify Protocol 14  
means that this institutional development cannot be legally implemented. 
 Currently it is primarily up to the parties to an application or the Court itself to raise 
the issue as to whether a precedent should be overruled. Campaigning organisations may be 
able to play a secondary role in advocating change in the jurisprudence by seeking the 
Court’s permission to submit third-party comments96 on the matter in a relevant case. We 
have seen this technique successfully deployed by Liberty in  Christine Goodwin
97
.  Kudla
98
 
is a classic example of a case where the applicant successfully persuaded the Court to 
overrule its previous case-law. By contrast in Perez
99
 it was the respondent State that 
convinced the Court of the need to change its jurisprudence. As we have learnt  from 
President Wildhaber
100
 members of the Court may quite frequently disagree with each other 
in their private deliberations over whether a precedent should be followed. Vilho
101
 is an 
example where such disagreements could not be resolved internally within the Court and 
erupted dramatically in the divergent majority and dissenting judgments. The majority took it 
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upon themselves to overrule the Pellegrin
102
 approach to interpreting Article 6(1) in civil 
service cases with neither the applicants nor the respondent State seeking to challenge the 
validity of the earlier judgment. 
 Turning to the issue of who has benefitted from the Court overruling established case-
law there is an inevitable degree of subjectivity in such an assessment of the effects of 
particular judgments. Nevertheless, we can offer our own analysis. Applicants can be said to 
have gained from Kudla
103
 as States were obliged to establish effective domestic remedies to 
deal with complaints of unreasonable delays in criminal and civil proceedings. Transsexuals, 
especially those living in the UK, benefitted from Christine Goodwin
104
 due to the obligation 
on States to provide full legal recognition of their new identities. Mandatory life prisoners 
secured greater judicial scrutiny over their continued detention from Stafford
105
. Applicants to 
the Court had their positions strengthened through Mamatkulov
106
 ruling that States were 
required to observe interim measures indicated by the Court. Public sector employees had 
their ability to invoke the civil aspects of Article 6(1) in litigation against their employer 
enhanced by Vilho
107
 and trade unions’, together with their members, bargaining rights were 
extended in Demir and Baykara
108
.  Finally, victims of serious abuse by State personnel 
benefitted from the Court’s broader approach to classifying such mal-treatment as torture 
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announced in Selmouni
109
.  States probably gained most from Pellegrin
110
 as it exempted a 
significant category of  civil servants from the ability to invoke the civil limb aspects of 
Article 6(1) against their employer. However, both States and applicants are likely to have 
gained from the clarification articulated in Perez
111
 regarding when civil-party proceedings 
fall within Article 6(1). The Court itself benefitted from Kudla
112
 as the provision of effective 
domestic remedies to deal with complaints of unreasonable delays in national courts offered 
the potential to somewhat reduce this burdensome source of complaints to Strasbourg. 
Though applications concerning the adequacy of such domestic remedies are now having to 
be determined by the Court.
113
 The Court also gained from Mamatkulov
114
 in the sense that its 
interlocutory powers were enhanced. Overall, we can, therefore, conclude that applicants and 
other persons in analogous situations have gained most from the Court’s willingness to 
overrule earlier jurisprudence. 
Conclusions 
We have learnt that the full-time Court has followed the practice of the original Court in 
avoiding expressly overruling earlier case-law. Nevertheless, we have discovered a number 
of cases where the full-time Court has impliedly overruled precedent with profound effects 
on the jurisprudence; examples include Kudla
115
, Christine Goodwin
116
, Stafford
117
, 
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Mamatkulov
118
 and Vilho
119
. Three separate grounds of justification for overruling have been 
detected in the case law;  uncertainty in the existing jurisprudence
120
,  rapidly increasing 
numbers of complaints to the Court concerning a specific right/freedom guaranteed by the 
Convention
121
 and the application of the living instrument doctrine to the interpretation of the 
Convention
122
. The latter ground has been the one most frequently invoked by the 
contemporary Court. This is in harmony with Professor Feldman’s incisive analysis of 
precedent within the original Court which emphasised that judgments are authoritative in 
accordance with the scientific understanding and social mores at the time of delivery, but 
subsequent developments in science or ethics may require corresponding new interpretations 
of the Convention.
123
 
 Our study has disclosed that applicants have been the prime beneficiaries of the Court 
overruling its previous case-law. Therefore, we should welcome the Court’s willingness to 
update its interpretations to match contemporary circumstances and requirements. Indeed, a 
failure of the Court to review the efficacy of its jurisprudence would result in the ossification 
of the case-law. Given the protracted nature of the State dominated reform  process via 
amending Protocols
124
, the Court has become the main engine of development regarding the 
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substantive rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention.  Hence, the Court ought to be 
more transparent in openly acknowledging when it is revising and altering its existing case-
law. At present it is often left to the dissenting judges  to expressly describe the Court’s 
judgment as constituting an overruling of precedent.
125
 In addition the Court should ensure 
that it provides adequate justification in respect of the changed social conditions/values or 
scientific knowledge that underpins an overruling judgment, as we have  noted that has not 
always been the practice of the Court.
126
  Today the Court has sufficient maturity to enable it 
to frankly address the topic of the overruling of previous case-law as discussed in our study. 
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